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Abstract
How do changes in monetary policy affect consumption? Using household data for the US 
and the UK, we show that most of the aggregate response of consumption to interest rates 
is driven by households with a mortgage. Outright home owners do not adjust expenditure 
at all and renters change their spending but by less than mortgagors. Income rises for all 
households as interest rate cuts directly affect fi rm investment and household consumption, 
boosting aggregate demand. A key difference between these housing tenure groups is the 
composition of their balance sheets: mortgagors hold sizable illiquid assets but little liquid 
wealth, consistent with a higher marginal propensity to consume.
Keywords: monetary policy, household balance sheets, liquidity constraints.
JEL classifi cation: E21, E32, E52.
Resumen
¿Qué efecto tiene la política monetaria sobre el consumo? Mediante el uso de información a 
nivel de hogar en el Reino Unido y Estados Unidos, este trabajo muestra que la mayor parte 
de la dinámica del consumo agregado después de un cambio en los tipos de interés a corto 
plazo, viene explicada por el comportamiento de los gastos de consumo de familias que 
son propietarias de una vivienda fi nanciada por hipoteca. Por el contrario, aquellas familias 
propietarias de vivienda pero sin hipoteca, no cambian sus gastos de consumo, mientras que 
el consumo de aquellas familias que alquilan una vivienda responde a los cambios en tipos 
pero de forma más atenuada que para las familias hipotecadas. Una diferencia crucial entre 
estos tres modelos de familia es la composición de sus balances: las familias hipotecadas 
poseen, de media, una cantidad signifi cativa de activos ilíquidos pero muy poca riqueza 
líquida, lo cual es congruente con una mayor propensión marginal a consumir. Una reducción 
en los tipos de interés genera, además de un incremento en el consumo, una expansión en la 
inversión en capital fi jo por parte de empresas, lo cual contribuye a un impacto positivo sobre 
la demanda agregada en la economía. 
Palabras clave: política monetaria, restricciones de liquidez, balance fi nanciero de las familias.
Códigos JEL: E21, E32, E52.
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1 Introduction
How monetary policy affects the real economy is one of the oldest and most intensively investi-
gated topics in macroeconomics. In many standard macroeconomic theories, interest rate changes
primarily affect household consumption through intertemporal substitution. The recent financial
crisis, however, has sparked a lively debate about whether other mechanisms could be equally, or
even more, important for the transmission of monetary policy.
A key part of this debate has focused on the financial positions of households. Mortgages make-
up the vast majority of household debt in the US and the UK, and nearly half the population
has a mortgage. As a result, there has been renewed interest in debt, household balance sheets
and the mortgage market — popularized by an influential set of papers highlighting the role of
household debt in the amplification of macroeconomic shocks (Mian et al. (2013), Mian and Sufi
(2014)). A growing body of theoretical work has been exploring how balance sheet differences
across households may amplify the transmission of monetary policy (e.g. Iacoviello (2005), Kaplan
et al. (2018), Mitman et al. (2016) and Bilbiie (2017)). In these models, some households exhibit
a high marginal propensity to consume out of temporary income shocks and this may vary with a
household’s financial position.
Despite the renewed interest in these issues, the literature is lacking a systematic empirical
investigation of whether differences in household balance sheets affect the transmission mechanism
of interest rate changes. We use household survey data for the U.S. and the U.K. to fill this gap.
Our contribution is to provide a novel set of empirical stylized facts about the heterogeneous effects
of monetary policy and use these results to assess different channels of monetary transmission.
Few, if any, datasets contain information on household expenditure and income, together with
assets and liabilities over a long period of time. This poses a significant challenge for studying
the effects of monetary policy on households with different balance sheet positions. Instead, we
use household survey data from the U.K. Living Costs and Food Survey and the U.S. Consumer
Expenditure Survey, which have extensive expenditure and income coverage and have been run for
many decades. These surveys are mostly cross-sectional and lack detailed balance sheet information,
but our innovation is to use a household’s housing tenure status — specifically whether they rent,
own their home with a mortgage or own without a mortgage — as a predictor of their debt and
asset positions, a fact that we document using lower frequency surveys. We construct pseudo-cohorts
based on the three housing tenure groups and tackle the endogeneity of policy interest rates using
identified monetary policy shocks for each country (Romer and Romer (2004), Cloyne and Huertgen
(2016)). This strategy allows us to study the heterogeneous effects on consumption, explore the
dynamics and consider the general equilibrium effects on household income.
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is significantly larger in the U.K. than in the U.S. — as might be expected given the prevalence of
variable rate mortgages in the U.K. — but the magnitudes are, on their own, too small to account
for the magnitude of the increase in mortgagors’ expenditure in either country. Rental payments
also go up and, therefore, cannot explain the increase in renters’ expenditure. Furthermore, since
household income increases significantly for all groups, heterogeneity in the expenditure response
In the first part of the paper, we show that the vast majority of the aggregate consumption
response to a temporary unanticipated interest rate change is driven by households with a mort-
gage. When interest rates fall, households with a mortgage increase their spending considerably,
while outright home-owners without mortgage debt do not change their expenditure at all. This
heterogeneity exists over and above any heterogeneity coming from demographic factors. Renters
also increase their spending, although by less than mortgagors.
In the second part of the paper, we ask: what theoretical mechanism is most consistent with
these results? We show that expansionary monetary policy leads to a significant increase in income
for all groups as lower interest rates directly affect firm investment and household expenditure,
boosting aggregate demand. But higher income only seems to translate into higher consumption
for mortgagors and renters. To explore this, we use lower-frequency US and UK wealth survey
data and show that the three housing tenure groups differ markedly in their holdings of liquid and
illiquid assets. Renters have little wealth and, being younger and poorer, fit the typical description
of liquidity constrained households. Mortgagors tend to have little liquidity, despite owning sizable
illiquid assets. Indeed, between 40 and 50% of households with mortgage debt have net liquid
wealth that is less than half of their monthly income, consistent with a significant proportion of
‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth consumers (Kaplan and Violante (2014))).1 In contrast, outright home-
owners have ample amounts of liquid and illiquid assets. Our housing tenure proxy is therefore
capturing two, very different, types of hand-to-mouth households. While our empirical strategy
is not suited to establishing a causal link between consumption and income, the heterogeneity in
the response of expenditure (relative to income) is consistent with theories where the marginal
propensity to consume varies with the composition of household balance sheets. Since mortgagors
are a large share of the population, our findings provide a new perspective on what drives the
aggregate effects of monetary policy.
We also examine a range of other possible explanations for heterogeneity in the expenditure re-
sponses and show these struggle to explain all our results. In particular, we show that the differences
across groups are not driven by heterogeneous changes in resources. The fall in mortgage payments
1The notion that debtors are liquidity constrained and exhibit high marginal propensities to consume can also be
found in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Iacoviello (2005).
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does not seem to be explained by any heterogeneity in the response of income. We also show that
our results cannot be explained easily, qualitatively or quantitatively, by differences across house-
holds in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the revaluation of nominal assets and liabilities
via inflation and other financial wealth effects. Of course, this does not mean that these channels
are necessarily insignificant; rather, a large expenditure response of mortgagors — who hold sizable
illiquid assets but little liquid wealth — seems to be of first-order importance in understanding the
transmission of monetary policy.
Two empirical issues are worth noting. First, households are not randomly assigned to be
mortgagors, outright owners or renters. Mortgagors may respond more than outright owners not
because of their balance sheet position, but because some other trait makes them more responsive
to interest rate changes. At the very minimum, our balance sheet proxy (i.e. housing tenure) is
still a strong predictor of the households most affected by monetary policy. But we also show that
the heterogeneity we uncover exists over and above any effect from demographics. Furthermore, we
show that other household characteristics are unlikely to explain our evidence. A second concern is
the possibility of endogenous transitions from one tenure status to another over time. In addition
to grouping by actual housing tenure, we therefore use a variant of the Attanasio et al. (2002)
propensity score approach which explicitly addresses the issue of compositional change.
Related literature. This paper relates to four strands of the recent literature. First, we provide
empirical support for theories that highlight the role of household balance sheet channels, credit
constraints and market incompleteness in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies. These
include Iacoviello (2005), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Kaplan et al. (2018), Mitman et al.
(2016), Luetticke (2015), Auclert (2015), Greenwald (2016), Mitman (2016), Werning (2015), McKay
et al. (2016) and Bilbiie (2017).
Second, our paper relates to a large empirical literature, surveyed by Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2010), estimating the response of consumption to exogenous income changes.2 Examples include
Johnson and Parker (2006), Parker et al. (2013), Misra and Surico (2014), Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2014), Baker (2017) and Cloyne and Surico (2017). Unlike this literature, we focus on the dynamic
effects of changes in monetary policy in the US and the UK and explore what we can learn about
the monetary transmission mechanism.
Third, a growing literature has studied how the structure of the mortgage market affects the
transmission of monetary policy. Using aggregate data for selected OECD economies, Calza et al.
(2013) show that countries with a higher debt to GDP ratio, an ability to extract housing equity
2Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Attanasio and Weber (1993) are early seminal contributions to this literature.
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and a higher share of adjustable rate mortgages tend to exhibit a larger average consumption
response, although their empirical approach does not identify the marginal contribution of each of
these features separately. Di Maggio et al. (2017) for the U.S., La Cava et al. (2016) for Australia,
Jappelli and Scognamiglio (2017) for Italy and Floden et al. (2016) for Sweden, find evidence that
the cash-flow channel via lower repayments on adjustable rate mortgages is active in these countries,
although they do not evaluate other channels in the transmission mechanism. The theoretical model
in Garriga et al. (2013) predicts that under adjustable mortgage rates the change in consumption
is only slightly larger than under fixed rates when the monetary policy shock is temporary (as in
this paper). They show, however, that the difference can become much larger if the policy shock is
very persistent (as in Di Maggio et al. (2017)).
Fourth, our findings complement evidence from an increasing number of studies that explore
heterogeneity in the effects of monetary policy and income shocks. These include, Coibion et al.
(2016), Wong (2016), Fagereng et al. (2016) and, on the more theoretical side, Gornemann et al.
(2012) and Sterk and Tenreyro (2015).
While we also share an interest in mortgage debt, repayments and heterogeneity, relative to
these studies, we focus on a broader set of household-level variables, including durable expenditure,
mortgage and rental payments and gross and net income. Furthermore, we compare the evidence
for the United States — a mortgage market in which access to housing equity is frequent and
fixed rate deals are prevalent — with the results for the United Kingdom — a mortgage market
in which access to housing equity is also frequent but fixed rate deals are less common. We show
that considering all these dimensions of heterogeneity together, and across countries, is important
for evaluating and disentangling different theoretical channels of monetary transmission.
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the datasets, discusses the identification of the monetary policy shocks and sets out the empirical
specification. The baseline estimates are reported in Section 3, together with two extensions that
control for demographic factors and endogenous compositional changes. In Section 4, we assess
which theoretical channels are most consistent with all our results. Section 5 briefly discusses what
components of demand account for the increase in household income. Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix contains some further results and robustness exercises.
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2 Data and empirical framework
In this section, we describe our main sources of household survey data and the variables we use.
We then lay out the strategy to group individual observations into pseudo-cohorts using housing
tenure status to proxy a household’s debt and asset position. We also discuss the identification of
the monetary policy shocks. Finally, we present our empirical specification.
2.1 Household survey data
In order to investigate how different types of consumers change their expenditure in response to
changes in monetary policy, we use household survey data with a rich coverage of expenditure
variables. For the U.K., we use the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS).3 For the U.S. we use
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Both surveys contain detailed information on weekly
expenditures on non-durable goods and services, durable goods (excluding housing and rental-
related costs) and household income. The latter is defined as labor income (wages and salaries)
plus non-labor income (income from investments and social security payments), net of taxes paid by
each household. In the appendix, we provide a more detailed description of the variable definitions
and the sample restrictions.
In addition, the survey provides information on two additional useful sets of variables (i) de-
mographics, in particular household size and the year of birth of the household head, (ii) mortgage
payments for households with outstanding debt and rental payments for renters. The information
on birth years will be used to verify that the heterogeneity we uncover across housing tenure groups
does not reflect (omitted) differences in life-cycle positions (as opposed to genuine differences in
debt positions over and above differences in demographics). The information on household size will
allow us to conduct the analysis at the per capita level. The mortgage and rental payments data
will be used to quantify the extent to which changes in cash flows can account for movements in
expenditure.
We convert the data into a quarterly time series using the date of interview. The resulting series
is then deflated by the Retail Prices Index (excluding mortgage interest payments) for the U.K.
3This survey was previously known as the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) and the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES).
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and the Consumer Price Index for the U.S. to convert the data into real series.4 Our sample covers
1975 to 2007 for the U.K. and 1981 to 2007 for the U.S.. The key variables of interest are available
in the FES from the mid-1970s whereas the CEX begins in 1981. Our focus is on the effects of
interest rate changes, so we deliberately stop just prior to the financial crisis, excluding the period
of unconventional monetary policy.
2.2 Grouping households into pseudo-cohorts
The first empirical challenge we face is that, to our knowledge, no U.S. and U.K. datasets contain
disaggregated information on both (i) wealth and household balance sheets and (ii) a rich array of
expenditure categories at the household level over a sufficiently long period of time. Unfortunately,
the LCFS and the CEX are no exceptions but they do record detailed expenditure and income
data as well as information on housing tenure status, namely whether a household lives in rented
accommodation, is an owner-occupier with a mortgage or owns the property outright without a
mortgage.
Housing tenure is a useful proxy for the balance sheet positions of households in both the
U.S. and the U.K.. Mortgagors, by definition, have sizable debt but also sizable wealth (which is
typically tied-up in their house). Outright owners have sizable housing and other financial wealth.
In contrast, renters tend to have low wealth. The housing tenure distinction therefore makes it
possible to bypass the lack of household balance sheet information in surveys that feature rich
4Previous research finds evidence consistent with possible trends in the under-reporting of expenditure for more
affluent households. This can lead to a divergence between expenditure measures aggregated in the CEX and those
from national statistics over time (Aguiar and Bils (2015)). To ensure consistency between the survey data and the
national statistics, while allowing for different trends in under-reporting (and other characteristics) across groups, we
do two things. First, we rescale expenditure for each cohort in the survey data by the ratio of the national statistics
series to the corresponding series aggregated from the CEX/LCFS. The adjusted expenditure series for each cohort are
reported in Appendix Figure C.2. Second, our cohort-specific regressions feature cohort-specific time trends. These
time trends are meant to absorb low-frequency variation in both under-reporting and other characteristics that are
specific to each group.
5In Section 4.2, we examine the balance sheet composition of each of these housing tenure groups.
expenditure and income data.5 Accordingly, and in keeping with the tradition of Browning et al.
(1985), we employ a grouping estimator to aggregate individual observations into pseudo-cohorts
by housing tenure.
It is worth discussing two potential concerns about grouping households. The first concern is
about endogenous changes in group composition. Specifically, a household may change housing
tenure status in response to a monetary policy shock. The second concern is about selection. The
assignments into the housing tenure groups are not random and some other characteristics may,
potentially, be responsible for the heterogeneous responses we find.
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In terms of compositional changes, the time series of the tenure shares in Figure 1 are clearly slow-
moving. The variation in monetary policy we exploit, however, occurs at a much higher frequency
(as can be seen from Figure 2). In Section 3, we provide formal evidence that compositional change
is unlikely to be driving our results. Specifically, we show that the monetary policy shocks do not
significantly affect the shares of households in each housing tenure group. Furthermore, we show
that our findings are not affected by using the propensity score method of Attanasio et al. (2002),
which deals with possible endogenous compositional change.
Turning to the issue of selection, three factors seem to make this less severe in our context. First,
we explicitly consider demographic and life cycle factors. In Section 3, we divide each housing tenure
cohort into further sub-groups using the age of the household-head. We show that the expenditure
response of middle-aged mortgagors is still significantly different from the response of middle-aged
outright owners, despite the more stable age range. The heterogeneity we uncover based on housing
tenure therefore exists over and above any possible heterogeneity purely due to demographic factors.6
Second, in Section 4, we explicitly consider which other characteristics might be driving our results
and show that alternative mechanisms struggle to explain our empirical findings. The composition of
household balance sheets therefore seems most likely to account for why some households respond
strongly to interest rate changes while others do not. Finally, grouping households by housing
tenure can be motivated from various theoretical frameworks. For example, the distinction between
consumers with and without mortgage debt fits well with the predictions of a range of theoretical
6Selected descriptive statistics for all housing tenure groups are reported in Appendix A. There are some small dif-
ferences across the distributions of per-capita income and across the shares of post-compulsory educational attainment
between mortgagors and outright owners. While the age difference between these two groups seems larger, (i) the age
distributions for mortgagors and outright owners still overlap significantly and (ii) as already noted, the heterogeneous
responses across housing tenure groups are not overturned in the sensitivity analysis of Section 3.2 where we further
control for demographics.
models that would imply heterogeneous expenditure responses to a monetary policy shock, including
Iacoviello (2005), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Kaplan et al. (2018).
2.3 Identification of monetary policy shocks
Our goal is to examine the effect of monetary policy on the spending and income of different groups
of households. As such, we face the usual macroeconomic reverse causation problem: the economy
responds to movements in monetary policy, but monetary policy also responds to developments in
the macroeconomy. To identify unanticipated changes in the short-term interest rate we need a
monetary policy shock series that can be used for estimation.
There is a vast literature on the identification of monetary policy changes. Older approaches,
mainly developed for the United States, relied on timing restrictions and a Choleski decomposition
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of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals from a Vector Autoregression, such as Christiano
et al. (1996, 1999). But when applied to the United Kingdom, this method produces a large rise
in inflation following a monetary contraction, the so-called price puzzle, even after controlling for
variables shown to ameliorate this issue for the U.S. (Cloyne and Huertgen (2016)).
Another popular approach for the U.S. was introduced by Romer and Romer (2004). This
method first constructs a measure of the target policy rate (since the effective Federal Funds Rate
is moved around by other factors than just policy decisions) and then regresses the change in the
target rate around the policy decision on a proxy for the information set available to the policymaker
just prior to that decision. This information set includes a range of real time indicators and forecasts
to reflect the forward-looking nature of monetary policy. Cloyne and Huertgen (2016) construct a
measure for the U.K. employing this methodology and show that it improves on conventional VAR
methods. Hence, we use an updated version of the Romer and Romer (2004) shock series for the
U.S. (whose original analysis ended in 1996) and the Cloyne and Huertgen (2016) shock series for
the UK.7 One particular advantage of using shocks based on the Romer and Romer (2004) method
is that we have two comparable series across the two countries we study.
The shock series match the micro-data sample periods, which are from 1975 to 2007 for the U.K.
and 1981 to 2007 for the U.S.. The shock series deliberately stop before the recent financial crisis,
when the policy rate hit the zero bound in both countries.8 To boost the number of household
observations used to generate the pseudo-cohorts at each point in time, we aggregate household
survey variables to a quarterly frequency. The original shock series are monthly but, following
Romer and Romer (2004) and Coibion (2012), we sum up the monthly innovations to obtain a
quarterly series. The construction of the U.K. series also allows for a break in 1993 reflecting
the adoption of the inflation targeting framework. The monetary policy shock series for the two
countries are shown in Figure 2.
Cohort-specific Granger causality. The shock series we use should already be regarded as
monetary innovations from a macroeconomic perspective. But there is still a concern that the
monetary policymakers might have been reacting to the conditions in particular groups. While some
of this should be captured in the policymakers’ forecasts, for example if they were concerned about
7Unfortunately, the length and frequency of the sample we consider prevents us from using a high frequency
identification strategy as in Gertler and Karadi (2015).
8Results using the Romer and Romer (2004) shocks might be sensitive to the period in the early 1980s when
monetary policy was conducted somewhat differently (Coibion (2012)). This is also the period where the share of
floating rate mortgages was unusually high in the U.S. Accordingly, in Appendix F, we verify that our findings are
not sensitive to starting the sample in 1985. This chimes with independent evidence from Wong (2016), who also
provides support for a household balance sheet effect on non-durable consumption across U.S. households using the
high-frequency identification in Gertler and Karadi (2015) over a shorter sample starting in 1993.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1813
developments in the housing market, it is useful for our purposes to test whether the U.S. and U.K.
shock series can be predicted by movements in cohort level consumption and income. Finding that
these shocks are unpredictable on the basis of cohort level concerns would therefore be reassuring.
Specifically, we conduct Granger causality tests based on a VAR which contains consumption,
expenditure and income per capita for each household group. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
the cohort-specific time-series from household survey data (as well as the aggregate time-series from
national statistics) do not Granger cause the monetary policy shocks in each country.
2.4 Empirical specification
Using the two monetary policy shock series, our empirical specification closely resembles Romer and
Romer (2004). Accordingly, we regress the variable of interest on a distributed lag of the monetary
policy shocks. As in Romer and Romer (2004), we also control for the lagged endogenous variable
as is common in exercises with relatively short samples. Specifically, we estimate the following
equation:
Xi,t = α
i
0 + α
i
1trend+B
i(L)Xi,t−1 + Ci(L)St−1 +Di(L)Zi,t−1 + ui,t (1)
where Xi,t is real non-durable consumption, durable expenditure or income recorded by households
interviewed at time t.9 The monetary policy shocks are denoted by S and Z is a vector of quarterly
dummies. The α terms represent intercepts and coefficients on a time trend polynomial, with a
break in 1993 for the U.K. (consistent with the time-series evidence in Benati (2006) and Nelson
(2001)) and no break for the U.S.. Finally, i ∈ Mortgagors,OutrightOwners,Renters refers to
the relevant housing tenure group. The orders of the lag polynomials are chosen using an optimal
lag length criteria, namely the corrected AIC.10 Standard errors are bootstrapped using a recursive
wild bootstrap following Mertens and Ravn (2013).11
9Households interviewed at time t are typically asked to report expenditure over the previous three months (with
the exception of non-durable consumption in the LCFS which refers to the previous two weeks). To eliminate some
of the noise inherent in survey data, Xi,t is smoothed with a backward-looking (current and previous three quarters)
moving average. In Appendix ??, we show that similar results are obtained without smoothing the data (although
point estimates become more jagged and imprecise) or smoothing the impulse response function (in the spirit of
Barnichon and Brownless (2017) and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016)).
10We have also explored a more general specification where X is a vector of variables, but with similar results. In
addition, we have experimented with including the contemporaneous value of the shock and with assuming different
types of trend. In all cases, our results are robust.
11The wild bootstrap in Mertens and Ravn (2013) randomly multiplies draws of the residuals by -1 and 1 and is
robust to heteroskedasticity.
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3 The heterogeneous response of expenditure
This section reports strong heterogeneity across housing tenure groups in the response of expen-
diture to a monetary policy shock. Mortgagors respond the most, outright owners do not change
expenditure at all, and the response of renters is closer to that of mortgagors. We first show results
based on actual housing tenure status. We then consider a more sophisticated propensity score ap-
proach that tackles concerns about endogenous changes in group composition. Finally, we explore
the role of demographics by restricting the age range within each housing tenure group. In all cases,
we simulate the effects of a temporary 25 basis points (bp) cut in the policy rate. The gray areas on
the charts show the 90% confidence intervals. For reference, in Appendix Figure C.1, we report the
aggregate responses of expenditure to a monetary policy shock using national accounts data. We
show that these are consistent with the disaggregated results using household survey micro-data.
3.1 Results based on housing tenure
In this section, we present the results from estimating our benchmark specification (1) using cohort-
level data. Figures 3 and 4 present our baseline estimates for the response of non-durable consump-
tion and durable expenditure across housing tenure groups. The left, middle and right-hand columns
show the different responses for mortgagors, outright owners and renters respectively.
Beginning with the response of non-durable consumption in Figure 3, the response of mortgagors
tends to be larger than the adjustment made by outright owners. Specifically, the response of
households with mortgage debt in the U.K. peaks at 0.3% after about 10 quarters but the response
of outright owners without debt is never statistically different from zero. The response of non-
durable expenditure for renters is similar to that of mortgagors at around 0.2%. This suggests that
the behavior of mortgagors and renters drives the aggregate results for non-durables in Appendix
Figure C.1. For the U.S. the pattern is similar, with the peak effects for renters and mortgagors
between 0.2% and 0.3%.
Clear evidence of heterogeneous effects across groups can also be seen in the response of durable
expenditure in Figure 4. The heterogeneity between housing tenure groups is now starker. The
response of U.K. mortgagors’ expenditure peaks at around 1.2%, but the reaction of outright owners’
durables is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The bottom row paints a similar picture for
the U.S., with the significant and persistent response of households with debt peaking around
1.2%, and driving the aggregate durable response reported in Appendix Figure C.1. The results
for renters’ durable expenditures are, however, typically smaller (especially in the U.K.) and less
precisely estimated than for the other cohorts, possibly reflecting the heterogeneous composition of
the renter group. Still, the durable expenditure of renters tends to increase, especially in the U.S.
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Given that there are differences in the average levels of expenditure and income across housing
tenure groups, it is useful to consider what these IRFs imply in dollar terms. This will also be
useful later when we quantify the contribution of different transmission mechanisms. In Table 1,
we convert the IRFs into an equivalent dollar change in expenditure over the four year forecast
period.12 This can be seen as the overall dollar adjustment in the short-run as a result of the
change in monetary policy.13 The overall effects on non-durable and durable expenditure in the
two countries are shown in the first two columns of Table 1. The other columns will be discussed
in Section 4.
Table 1 shows that the total dollar change in mortgagors’ expenditure (non-durables and durables)
12More detail on the calculation can be found in the notes to Table 1.
13The response of the policy rate to the monetary policy shock tends to be slightly more persistent in the U.S. than
in the U.K., as can be seen in Coibion (2012) and Cloyne and Huertgen (2016). To make the magnitudes comparable,
we rescale the U.K. numbers by the ratio of the cumulated response of the U.S. Federal Funds Rate and the cumulated
response of the U.K. Bank Rate. This is like rescaling by the relative movement in the long-rate.
14The absolute magnitudes of the numbers in Table 1 may seem small but we are considering a small and temporary
change in interest rates (i.e. a change of 25 basis points on impact, which then returns to zero after about four to
eight quarters). The size of our monetary policy shock is therefore about twelve times smaller and more than six
times less persistent than the shock analyzed in Keys et al. (2015) and Di Maggio et al. (2015).
15More specifically, based on the distributions of the expenditure responses for each group in Table 1, we calculate
that the interquartile range of the share of the aggregate response accounted for by mortgagors is about 77-90% for
the U.K. and 61-79% for the U.S..
is very similar across the two countries, with U.K. mortgagors spending around 70 dollars (about
10%) more than those in the U.S. following a cut in interest rates of the same magnitude. The dol-
lar changes for the other two housing tenure groups are also similar across countries and spending
categories, with the possible exception of the response of durable expenditure for renters. Over-
all, mortgagors display the largest and most significant overall dollar adjustment whereas outright
owners experience a small and insignificant change.14 This difference is not only economically
meaningful but also statistically significant.
In summary, in response to a cut in interest rates, the response of expenditure tends to be large
and significant for mortgagors but small and insignificant for outright owners, with the heterogene-
ity being more pronounced for durable goods. The response of renters tends to be closer to the
response of mortgagors than outright owners, especially for non-durable goods and services. Since
mortgagors represent around 40-50% of the population, the response of mortgagors accounts for the
vast majority of the aggregate effect of monetary policy on consumption.15
3.2 Controlling for demographics
One possible concern is that the housing tenure distinction may simply be picking up (omitted) life-
cycle effects. Although we can include demographic controls in our regressions, given the grouping
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strategy, this does not condition on demographics in the usual sense. Conditioning requires further
splitting the groups by demographics. To explore this possibility, we follow the micro-econometric
literature and construct birth cohorts.16 We regard households as ‘older’ if the head was born
before 1935, as ‘middle-aged’ if the head was born in the interval [1935, 1949] and as ‘younger’ if
the head was born after 1949. This strategy therefore produces groups with a more stable age range
than our baseline grouping strategy. For example, while the maximum possible age gap within the
middle-aged group at each point in time is 14 years, it is important to note that the interquartile
range is around 6 years.
16The objective in a pseudo-panel is to construct a group with relatively stable composition over time. Directly
grouping by age does not satisfy this requirement as we would be constructing a representative household who never
ages.
17Unfortunately, there are neither enough mortgagors in the older birth cohort nor enough outright owners in the
younger birth cohort for us to look at these two other sub-groups. Furthermore, we find little heterogeneity within
the renter group.
Before reporting the results of this exercise, it is useful to consider the demographic composition
of the housing tenure groups. As shown in Appendix Figure B.2, a greater share of mortgagors
are younger and there is a prevalence of outright home-owners without mortgage debt among the
older households. But, importantly, not all younger households are mortgagors and not all older
households are outright home-owners. Furthermore, the middle-aged cohort is populated by even
shares of all housing tenure groups.
Within each housing tenure group, we sub-divide households into birth cohorts. We then consider
two separate experiments to explore whether age/life-cycle considerations could be driving our
heterogeneous responses. First, we investigate whether the response of middle-aged mortgagors is
similar to the response of middle-aged outright owners.17 Second, we examine whether excluding
households with a retired head makes any difference to our results.
Comparing the first and the second columns in Figures 7 and 8 reveals that the expenditure
responses for middle-aged mortgagors are large and significant, while those for middle-aged outright
owners are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is true both in terms of the
magnitude and in terms of the significance of the point estimates (both for non-durable consumption
and durable expenditure). Consistent with the results in the previous section, middle-aged renters
generally respond less than mortgagors but significantly more than outright owners. The hetero-
geneity across housing tenure groups therefore exists even for cohort groups with a more stable age
range. In the Appendix Figures D.1 and D.2, we also consider restricted samples from the LCFS
and the CEX where we exclude households with a retired head. The results are very similar to our
baseline findings above.
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In summary, the estimates in the previous section are not overturned when considering the
impact of demographics. In particular, the heterogeneous responses associated with housing tenures
status appear to hold over and above any possible heterogeneity associated with age or birth cohort.
3.3 A propensity score approach
By classifying households into particular groups, we are implicitly assuming that group transitions
are not a significant concern. In particular, to interpret our estimates as the causal effect of monetary
policy on the expenditure of mortgagors, we need that the policy change does not cause households
to move from one housing tenure status to another. Note that this is likely to be more problematic,
if anything, for the U.K. survey data which consist of repeated cross-sections, than for the U.S.
survey data where, given the short panel dimension, we already consider only those households
who have not changed housing tenure status between interviews. The risk of group transitions
seems limited given the slow-moving housing tenure shares that we report in Figure 1 and the small
(25bps) monetary policy change we consider. But, in this section, we assess formally the empirical
relevance of possible changes in group compositional.
One simple way to tackle this issue is to look at the response of the housing tenure group shares
to an unanticipated cut in interest rates. In Appendix Figure E.1, we show that none of the group
shares respond significantly, indicating that changes in monetary policy do not seem to trigger
significant endogenous changes in the housing tenure status.18
A more formal approach is to apply the Attanasio et al. (2002) propensity score method. Rather
than grouping households based on actual housing tenure, this approach groups households based on
the probability of being a mortgagor using fully predictable household characteristics. Specifically,
we run a probit regression over the full sample to generate individual predicted probabilities of
having a mortgage based on a high order polynomial in age, education, a time trend and their
interactions.19 For households observed in quarter t, we compute the probability that they had
a mortgage in the previous quarter. For these two periods, we classify households as ‘likely’ or
‘unlikely mortgagors’ if the probability in the first of the two periods is larger or smaller than the
share of mortgagors in the sample.20 We then take the growth in consumption across these two
18While it may be theoretically possible that the inflows into one group might be offset by its outflows, it would
seem difficult to think that at the same time, for example, some renters become mortgagors and other households
with debt become renters following a monetary policy shock.
19To maximize the number of households in each quarter and cohort, we place no restrictions on the birth year of
the household head in this exercise but include age among the demographic variables in the probit regressions. To
sharpen the comparison we do not include renters in the analysis in this section. While these restrictions do not affect
the point estimates from the propensity score method significantly, they improve their accuracy.
20As time variation in the probability of being a mortgagor may induce changes in the group composition, we use
a constant threshold for determining the group of ‘likely’ mortgagors.
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quarters for each group, from which we can construct the implied consumption series for each of
the groups that we then use for estimation.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figures 5 and 6. As can be seen, the main findings of
our earlier analysis are not overturned. The likely mortgagor group still exhibits stronger expendi-
ture responses than the unlikely mortgagors, with the difference being particularly pronounced for
durables and in line with the results on actual housing tenure. Changes in group composition are
21To be precise: heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume could interact with a range of other mechanisms.
Our point is that, without this, other mechanisms are unlikely to be able to explain all our findings.
22In theory, the mechanisms that generate heterogeneous MPCs — such as incomplete markets and credit constraints
— may or may not amplify the effects of monetary policy on consumption. On the one hand, hand-to-mouth
behaviour can attenuate the initial direct (partial equilibrium) effect of monetary policy on consumption (for example,
by attenuating the degree of intertemporal substitution). On the other hand, these frictions can lead to a larger
consumption response via general equilibrium effects: higher aggregate demand leads to more income, generating
more consumption etc. Important contributions to this theoretical debate are Werning (2015), McKay et al. (2016),
Bilbiie (2017) and Kaplan et al. (2018). In particular, Kaplan et al. (2018) show that the presence of “wealthy hand to
mouth” agents can amplify the effects of monetary policy, and that the indirect general equilibrium effects dominate
the direct partial equilibrium effects. Our results are supportive of the dominance of the general equilibrium effect.
therefore unlikely to drive the heterogeneous expenditure responses we found above.
4 Inspecting the transmission mechanism
In the previous section, we showed that there is significant heterogeneity in the response of expen-
diture to monetary policy shocks across housing tenure groups. Furthermore, this heterogeneity is
not driven by heterogeneity in demographics. In this section, we explore which mechanism may be
consistent with our results. To do so, we consider a rich set of household-specific variables in the
micro-data as well as other, relevant, aggregate variables in the national statistics.
We show that our results are consistent with theories where the marginal propensity to consume
varies with the composition of household balance sheets. In particular, some households may exhibit
larger marginal propensities to consume if they have few liquid assets.21 By directly affecting
investment and consumption decisions, interest rate cuts raise GDP and household income. For
hand-to-mouth households, the increase in income leads to additional expenditure, which may
stimulate aggregate demand further.22
We explore this mechanism in two parts. First, we document a significant rise in income for
all housing tenure groups and examine how expenditure responds relative to income — mortgagors
exhibit the largest response of expenditure relative to income. Second, we analyse independent
household survey data on wealth, and find that the balance sheets of the three housing tenure
groups differ markedly in their composition of liquid and illiquid wealth. In particular, we show
that our findings are consistent with two, very different, types of hand-to-mouth households: low
wealth renters and wealthy mortgagors.
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We also explore other channels that might account for our findings. For instance, the heteroge-
neous response of expenditure may simply reflect heterogeneity in the response of disposable income
— either because mortgage and rental payments fall, or because monetary expansions increase earn-
ings only for mortgagors and renters. In addition, a higher sensitivity of consumption to interest
rates for some groups could reflect a higher elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. Finally, the
effects may represent wealth redistribution across households from movements in goods and asset
prices. All these mechanisms are likely to play a role in the transmission mechanism but we illus-
trate why, on their own, these explanations would struggle to explain the heterogeneity we find in
the data.
4.1 The response of income
Household expenditure may respond directly to interest rate changes, for example through substitu-
tion effects. But the overall response of expenditure may also be affected by the general equilibrium
effects that monetary policy has on GDP and household income. This section explores how income
responds across groups and document two key results. First, we show that income responds for all
household groups, consistent with a general equilibrium effect of monetary policy. Second, we show
that the heterogeneity documented in the previous section does not reflect heterogeneity in the re-
sponse of income. If the income of some groups is more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, then
the heterogeneity in resource windfalls associated with a monetary expansion may be the driver of
heterogeneity in the expenditure responses across groups (Gornemann et al. (2012)).
In Figure 9, we report the point estimates and confidence bands for the response of total house-
hold income net of taxes. We also report the point estimates for gross income.23 Income net of
taxes responds significantly for all three housing tenure groups and increases by a similar propor-
tion across countries and cohorts. The peak effects are typically between 0.3 and 0.4%. It is useful
to note that, despite the expenditure heterogeneity across groups, there is limited heterogeneity
in the IRFs for income.24 This is consistent with the notion that the increase in household re-
sources triggered by the monetary policy shock is likely driven by an overall increase in aggregate
demand. In other words, expenditure heterogeneity does not simply reflect earnings heterogeneity.
To compare these income effects to the change in expenditure, it is useful to convert the IRFs into
a ‘windfall’ in dollars. This is shown in the Table 1. Converting the percentage changes into dollar
amounts reveals that the response of expenditure relative to income is still sizable for mortgagors
and considerably smaller for outright owners. Furthermore, in both countries, the dollar increase
23We only report the point estimates for gross income purely for presentational convenience. The confidence bands
for this measure largely overlap with those of net income.
24In Appendix G, we show that similar results are obtained using labour income rather than total income.
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in mortgagors’ income is of the same order of magnitude as the dollar change in mortgagors’ total
expenditure.25
Disposable income may also be affected by changes in taxes if fiscal policy responds to the fall
in interest rates. This could be the case if, for instance, lower interest payments on government
debt encourage tax cuts. But Figure 9 shows that the movements in gross and net income are very
similar, with the difference being insignificant. The majority of the movement in net income is
therefore driven by the response of gross income and not by movements in taxes.26
To summarize, the increase in aggregate income is shared across all housing tenure groups,
consistent with a general equilibrium effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand. Heterogeneity
in the response of income therefore does not explain our results for expenditure. Table 1 also implies
that higher income for all groups is associated with higher expenditure only for mortgagors and
renters.
4.2 Liquidity shortages for the poor and the ‘wealthy’
In the previous section, we showed that income increases for all groups, but expenditure increases
only for renters and mortgagors. Furthermore, the dollar change in expenditure for these two groups
is of a similar order of magnitude to the dollar change in their income (Table 1). While renters
seem to fit the traditional characterization of hand-to-mouth households, a strong sensitivity of
consumption to income for mortgagors is hard to reconcile with traditional one-asset models. A
number of recent theories, however, emphasize the role of debtors and balance sheets in the trans-
mission of macroeconomic policy. For example, in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) the presence of
debt constraints facing borrowers generate heterogeneous MPCs, a mechanism that can vary over
time if (as in Iacoviello (2005)) the credit limit is tied to the value of the asset used as collateral.
In Kaplan et al. (2014, 2018), consumers can be wealthy but still behave in a constrained manner
if most of their wealth is tied-up in an illiquid asset (such as housing). In other words, mortgagors
may become hand to mouth by purchasing a large housing asset.
Prima facie evidence that both renters and mortgagors may face liquidity shortages is provided
by Table 2. At the one end of the spectrum, renters have little ‘cash on hand’ and no housing
25While we focus on the response of consumption and income separately here, in independent work on fiscal policy
Surico and Trezzi (2018) show that Italian mortgagors have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of temporary
tax windfalls. This is also consistent with the MPC estimates in Misra and Surico (2014) for the U.S..
26Gross income responds slightly less than net income, consistent with Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who show that
a monetary expansion is associated with a fall in net taxes receipts.
wealth, consistent with the notion of poor hand to mouth consumers. At the other end, outright
owners have sizable financial and housing wealth and seem unconstrained. In-between, mortgagors,
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in both countries, have little liquid assets despite having significant housing equity. As such, they
appear to fit well the definition of ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth (WHTM) households put forward by
Kaplan and Violante (2014), and further explored empirically by Cloyne and Surico (2017) in the
context of U.K. tax changes.
To explore this hypothesis in more detail, we draw on independent evidence on household wealth
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF)
for the (multi-year) waves that correspond to our baseline samples.27 Following Kaplan and Violante
(2014), we define a household as ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth if at any given point in time both (i) their
net illiquid wealth is positive and (ii) their net liquid wealth is less than half of their total monthly
labor income.28 In Figure 11, we report the share of ‘wealthy’ hand-to-mouth mortgagors for pairs
of temporally close waves in the BHPS and SCF. The message from this chart is that between 40%
and 50% of households with debt hold a value of liquid assets below half of their monthly income
and therefore are likely to face liquidity shortages. In the second panel of Figure 11, we also show
that most WHTM agents in the sample do have a mortgage.
In summary, renters have low wealth and fit the typical description of liquidity constrained
households. Their strong consumption response may not, therefore, be surprising. But, importantly,
a significant share of mortgagors have low liquidity despite having high wealth. These balance sheet
characteristics, coupled with the significant increase in after-tax income for all groups, suggest that
heterogeneity in liquid asset holdings can account for the heterogeneity in expenditure documented
earlier.29 In Appendix I, we lay out a simple theoretical framework with collateral constraints, a
renting/owning decision and durable expenditures that captures this idea. We show that this model
can replicate our evidence on the heterogeneous responses of non-durable and durable expenditure
across different households groups.
27These surveys do not contain wealth information at a sufficiently high frequency to be used for our main analysis
and they lack rich consumption data over a long period of time. While there are more SCF waves than reported here,
there are only three waves of the BHPS over our sample period (but we have confirmed that similar results emerge
from the SCF waves that we have not reported).
28When constructing the relevant household income and wealth measures, we select variables to make the concepts
of net liquid and illiquid wealth as consistent as possible across the two datasets. The BHPS only reports quantities
for overall investment and debts whereas for specific assets it only records whether these are held or not. The SCF,
in contrast, does provide quantities for particular assets and overall investment. Furthermore, the assets on which
information is provided differ slightly between surveys. Accordingly, net liquid wealth in the U.K. is constructed
as total amount of liquid savings and investments (National Savings Bank Accounts and Cash ISAs or TESSAs,
Premium Bonds, Stocks and shares ISAs or PEPs) minus non-mortgage debt (Hire purchase agreements, Personal
Loans, Credit and store cards, DWP Social Fund loans). Following Kaplan and Violante (2014), net liquid wealth
in the U.S. is the value of checking, saving and MM accounts, directly held mutual funds, stocks, bonds and t-bills,
net of outstanding unsecured debt. Net illiquid wealth in the U.K. is measured using a binary variable which takes
value one if housing equity> 0 or the household has positive investments in (relatively) illiquid instruments such as
National Saving Certificates, NS/BS insurance bonds, private pensions, non-regular savings. Net illiquid wealth in
the U.S. is the value of housing equity (housing value - mortgage debt) plus pension/retirement funds, life insurance,
saving bonds and certificate of deposits.
29As emphasized by Tobin (1980) (p.10), this hand to mouth behaviour by mortgagors could be entirely rational
and optimal if, for instance, this group of households expect future income growth but find it difficult to borrow
against this.
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4.3 Mortgage and rental payments
A fall in interest rates can also affect the resources available to households by affecting interest
payments and rents. These windfalls from lower interest or rental payments might then be spent on
durables and non-durables in a way that could potentially rationalize the expenditure heterogeneity
we documented in the previous section.30 In our survey data, we observe both variables and we
therefore explore how mortgage and rental payments react to monetary policy changes.
In Figure 10, we report the percentage change in mortgage payments (top row) and rents follow-
ing a temporary interest rate cut of 25 basis points. Mortgage payments fall significantly in both
countries but the effect is considerably faster and larger in the U.K., peaking at around 0.7% versus
0.4% for the U.S.
As in the previous section, to compare these effects to the change in expenditure, it is useful
to convert the IRFs into a ‘windfall’ in dollars. This is shown in the third column of Table 1. A
few points are worth noting. First, the dollar benefit of this change for the average mortgagor is
nearly three times larger in the U.K. than in the U.S. Interestingly, the absolute difference between
the two point estimates is also consistent with the difference in total expenditure for mortgagors in
the two countries (columns 1 and 2).31 The relative size and speed of the adjustment in mortgage
payments is intuitive given the historic prevalence of adjustable rate mortgages in the U.K. market
(Besley et al. (2013)). Finally, and most importantly, the dollar fall associated with lower mortgage
payments is considerably smaller than the dollar increase in total expenditure — the expenditure
30Note that financial income is already included in our measure of household income. Any cash-flow effect on savers
is therefore already captured in our income responses. Since outright owners do not alter their expenditure, this
section focuses on cash flows for mortgagors and renters.
31The size of the dollar change in the average mortgage payments is consistent with a back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation using an effective mortgage duration of ten years, an effective loan to value ratio on outstanding debt of 0.5
and, for the U.K., the average house value from the Land Registry since 1995 (and from Halifax before then) as well
as a share of mortgages on adjustable rates of 45%. This yields an average change in U.K. mortgage payments of
168 US dollars. Replacing the UK share of mortgage contracts on adjustable rates with a share of 15% for the U.S.,
we obtain a value of 56 dollars. Note that our results are an average of the effect on loan rates for newly originated
mortgages and the effect on existing adjustable and fixed rate loans.
changes are four and nine times larger than the changes in mortgage payments in the U.K. and the
U.S. respectively. This suggests that the windfall from lower mortgages payments is quantitatively
too small to account for the magnitude of the rise in the expenditure of mortgagors.
The response of rental payments tells a similar story. On the one hand, a monetary expansion
lowers the user cost of housing. On the other hand, a fall in interest rates could lead to a rise
in house prices — as we document in Appendix Figure H.1 for both countries — and therefore
encourage the demand for renting relative to buying. The bottom row of Figure 10 shows that,
in the data, the latter effect dominates and rental payments increase. Yet, renters increase their
expenditure on both non-durable and durable goods.
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In summary, mortgage payments move significantly more in the U.K. than in the U.S., but
the magnitudes are much smaller than the overall dollar increase in expenditure. Furthermore,
movements in rental payments do not free up extra resources because they actually increase following
a monetary expansion. These cash flow effects are, on their own, unlikely to explain why mortgagors
respond differently from outright owners.32 These effects also cannot explain why renters respond
differently from other households without mortgage debt. Interestingly, our findings are consistent
with the theoretical predictions in Garriga et al. (2013), who show that the distinction between
adjustable and fixed rate mortgages implies a small difference in the consumption responses to a
temporary monetary policy shock (as we consider here) but a large difference to a very persistent
monetary shock (as considered in empirical work Di Maggio et al. (2017))
4.4 Intertemporal substitution
Differences in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) may also explain heterogeneity in
the expenditure responses across housing tenure groups. There is a large literature estimating the
EIS across households and several papers have argued that the EIS is likely to be increasing with
wealth (see Guvenen (2006) and Attanasio and Weber (2010) for an overview). Blundell et al.
(1994) report evidence that the EIS is larger for more affluent households and that wealth is a more
important driver of EIS heterogeneity than demographics. More specifically, Attanasio et al. (2002)
estimate that the EIS is around one for stock-holders — who are wealthier households — but only
between 0.1 and 0.2 for households who do not participate in financial markets.
As shown in Table 2, outright owners tend to be richer than renters and have more financial
assets than mortgagors. They also tend to be well-off households in general. Based on the empirical
evidence above, one would therefore expect the outright owners to have a high EIS. But to explain
our results, the outright owners would need to have a very low sensitivity of consumption to interest
rates and thus a very low EIS. Similarly, mortgagors and renters would need to have a considerably
higher EIS to be, even qualitatively, consistent with our results.33 Since mortgagors do not, on
average, have sizable net financial wealth (Table 2) and renters tend to be poorer, we conclude that
heterogeneity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unable to explain the heterogeneity
in expenditure we find.
32Of course, in the presence of heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume, this cash flow channel could lead
to additional consumption, further boosting aggregate demand.
33Best et al. (2015) estimate a low EIS for mortgagors in the United Kingdom.
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4.5 Fisher and other wealth effects
By raising inflation, expansionary monetary policy may revalue both sides of the household balance
sheet, leading to a redistribution of wealth from net savers to net borrowers (see, for example, the
large and permanent change in inflation considered in Doepke and Schneider (2006)). As shown in
Table 2, our housing tenure grouping identifies mortgagors as net borrowers and outright owners as
net savers.
There are at least two reasons why a Fisher effect does not easily explain the heterogeneous
response of expenditure to small and temporary monetary policy shocks that we find. First, if this
channel was driving the dynamics of expenditure, then the impulse responses for inflation would
look broadly similar to the impulse responses for expenditure. Consistent with the wider macro
literature (e.g. Romer and Romer (2004) and Christiano et al. (1999)), however, Figure 12 shows
that the effect of an interest rate cut on inflation and one-year-ahead expected inflation build over
time, with small and insignificant responses in the near-term and more significant effects only after
the first seven quarters. In contrast, the adjustment in durable expenditure is already large and
significant within the first two years for both countries. Second, if a Fisher effect is driving our
results, we would expect the spending responses to be of a similar magnitude but with opposite
signs for borrowers and savers (i.e. mortgagors and outright home-owners in our sample). Durable
expenditure, however, moves in the same direction across all groups and, although outright owners’
non-durable expenditure does fall slightly, the non-durable responses are never statistically different
from zero.
Finally, a fall in interest rates is also likely to raise the price of financial assets, including housing,
34See Coibion (2012) and Cloyne and Huertgen (2016).
and this may lead to additional wealth effects. It seems unlikely, however, that these effects alone
could explain the heterogeneity in expenditure we find. First, we consider a small (25 bps) and
short-lived fall in the interest rate which is unwound within two years.34 Furthermore, any effect on
asset prices should be more beneficial for those with a larger amount of net financial assets. Since
outright owners — the group holding the largest amount of net financial assets — do not adjust
their expenditure at all, it is unlikely that these pure wealth effects could be, on their own, the
main driver of our results.
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5 What is behind the movement in income?
In the previous sections, we have shown that heterogeneity in the access to liquidity combined with
a sizable effect of monetary policy on household income can account for the evidence presented so
far. Furthermore, in Table 1, we have also shown that the dollar changes in income are not only
significant for all groups but are also larger than the dollar changes in expenditure. This implies that
the overall increase in labor and capital income across the three housing tenure groups is larger than
the overall household expenditure increase in the economy. In other words, the change in interest
rates must trigger a response in the other components of aggregate expenditure. In this section, we
therefore explore the response of government spending, private investment and net exports using
aggregate data.
In the left column of Figure 13, we do not find evidence that government spending reacts to
a monetary policy shock. In contrast, the middle column reveals that investment does respond
strongly and significantly, which is consistent with the evidence in several empirical macro studies
(e.g. Christiano et al. (1999)). This is important because it reveals that the extra demand driving
the increase in household income comes from the private sector rather than from the government.
The extra demand also does not come from the rest of the world. In theory, the effect of monetary
policy on net exports could be ambiguous, depending on whether the expenditure switching effect
(from the exchange rate depreciation) increases exports by more than the rise in imports coming
from increased household expenditure on both foreign and domestic goods. In the right column
of Figure 13, we find that net exports fall in both countries, with the adjustment being slightly
larger for the United States. While this is consistent with the United Kingdom being a more open
economy, it suggests that the income effect (on expenditure) dominates the expenditure switching
effect.
In summary, the boost to household income following a relaxation of monetary policy reflects
increased demand from the domestic private sector rather than expenditure by the government or the
rest of the world. Interestingly, this is consistent with the theoretical results in the supplementary
note by Kaplan et al. (2016) where household liquidity is provided by the private sector rather than
by the government, as in their original paper (Kaplan et al. (2018)).
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6 Conclusion
What features of household balance sheets, if any, matter for the transmission of monetary policy?
Our analysis suggests that households with a mortgage tend to hold little liquid wealth and there-
fore exhibit hand-to-mouth behaviour despite owning sizable illiquid assets. Outright owners, in
contrast, hold sufficient liquid assets and therefore hardly change their spending at all. Renters —
whose financial circumstances are closer to the traditional characterization of liquidity constrained
households in one-asset models — also exhibit behavior consistent with a high marginal propensity
to consume. We reach these conclusions by performing a detailed and extensive evaluation of the
effects of temporary interest rate changes using household survey data for the U.S. and U.K..
While our empirical approach cannot shed light on the causal link between consumption and
income, our evidence is consistent with the view that expansionary monetary policy has a direct
effect on aggregate demand by stimulating firm investment and household expenditure. This, in
turn, raises household income for all groups, but translates into higher consumption only for house-
holds with low liquid wealth. Our key contribution is to show that the response of mortgagors is
consistent with a sizable share of this group having a high marginal propensity to consume. Given
that mortgagors are the largest housing tenure group in the population, their behaviour drives the
aggregate response and has first order implications for the transmission of monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Share of mortgagors, outright home owners and renters in the U.K. (source: FES/LCFS,
1975-2009) and the U.S. (source: CEX, 1981-2009).
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Figure 2: Monetary policy shocks series. United Kingdom: Cloyne and Huertgen (2016); United
States: updated version of Romer and Romer (2004).
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Figure 3: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on the consumption of non-durable goods and services by
housing tenure group. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Top row: UK (FES/LCFS data). Bottom row: US (CEX
data).
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Figure 4: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on the expenditure of durable goods by housing tenure group.
Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Top row: UK (FES/LCFS data). Bottom row: US (CEX data).
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Figure 5: UK results for non-durable, durable and income net of taxes for “likely” and “unlikely”
mortgagors, excluding renters. Groups computed following Attanasio et al (2002) propensity score
approach using a fixed probability threshold. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 6: US results for non-durable, durable and income net of taxes for “likely” and “unlikely”
mortgagors, excluding renters. Groups computed following Attanasio et al (2002) propensity score
approach using a fixed probability threshold. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 7: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on non-durable consumption (top) and durable expenditure
(bottom) for mortgagors born after 1949 (left column), mortgagors born between 1935 and 1949 (middle column) and outright owners
born before 1935 (right column). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. U.K. data: FES/LCFS (1975-2007).
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Figure 8: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on non-durable consumption (top) and durable expenditure
(bottom) for mortgagors born after 1949 (left column), mortgagors born between 1935 and 1949 (middle column) and outright owners
born before 1935 (right column). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. U.S. data: CEX (1981-2007).
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Figure 9: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on net income (blue) and gross income (red). Mortgagors
(left), outright owners (center) and renters (right). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90\% confidence bands for net income. Top row: UK
(FES/LCFS data). Bottom row: US (CEX data).
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Figure 10: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on mortgage and
rental payments. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. Left: UK (FES/LCFS data).
Right: US (CEX data).
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Figure 11: Shares of Wealthy Hand-To-Mouth (WHTM) mortgagors. U.K. (U.S.) data: 1995, 2000,
2005 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (Survey of Consumer Finances). A household is
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Figure 12: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on CPI inflation (top
row) and expected (1yr) inflation (bottom row). Left: UK. Right: US.
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Figure 13: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on gross private investment (first column), government
expenditures (consumption plus investment; second column), and net exports (X-M) (third column). Top row: UK (aggregate ONS
data). Bottom row: US (aggregate NIPA data).
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Table 1: Cumulative changes over four years in US$
Panel A: United Kingdom
Non-durable Durable Mortgage or After-tax
consumption expenditure rental payments income
Mortgagors 308.3 292.3 -166.4 695.9
[112.8, 516.1] [ 189.2 , 369.0 ] [ -272.2 , -41.7 ] [ 186.5 , 1105.1 ]
Outright -62.6 46.5 451.7
owners [ -148.2 , 77.4] [ -24.6 , 107.6 ] [ 122.5 , 797.2 ]
Renters 155.3 19.0 64.7 397.3
[ 17.9 , 261.8 ] [-36.5 , 62.9 ] [4.4 , 118.7 ] [ 94.2 , 596.1 ]
Panel B: United States
Non-durable Durable Mortgage or After-tax
consumption expenditure rental payments income
Mortgagors 305.8 229.3 -56.3 757.3
[ 58.3 , 554.3 ] [ 122.0 , 350.8 ] [ -112.8 , -4.3 ] [ 196.8 , 1302.0 ]
Outright -72.3 54.8 585.3
owners [ -324.8 , 186.0 ] [ -10.5 , 127.8 ] [ 83.3 , 1012.8 ]
Renters 223.3 123.5 64.8 439.3
[ 32.3 , 412.3 ] [ 30.3 , 213.8 ] [ 9.8 , 121.5 ] [ 112.8 , 699.8 ]
Note: The Table reports the overall dollar change in expenditure over the four year period
following a temporary 25bps cut in monetary policy, together with the bootstrapped 90% con-
fidence bands. The magnitudes are per household averages. To compute these numbers we
cumulate the IRFs and divide by the average value of each variable for each cohort in each
country (shown in Appendix Table B.1). We use the U.S. price level in 2007 and the average
exchange rate between pounds sterling and U.S. dollars in that year. Using the average ex-
change rate over the full sample would make the dollar changes for the U.K. some 10% lower
but would not affect the fact that the estimated values in each column are of the same order
of magnitude across the two countries.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1813
Table 2: Household Financial and Housing Wealth for the UK and US.
UK BHPS: 1995 US SCF: 1995
Median [p25 , p75] Median [p25 , p75]
Net Financial wealth
Outright owners 2,000 [0 , 10,000] 3,505 [165 , 18,455]
Mortgagors 150 [-753 , 3,450] 1,505 [-695 , 8,705]
Renters 0 [-25 , 559] 5 [-545 , 2,005]
Net Housing wealth
Outright owners 59,000 [42,000 , 80,000] 86,000 [52,000 , 142,000]
Mortgagors 28,000 [10,000 , 51,750] 43,500 [20,000 , 86,000]
Renters 0 0 0 0
UK BHPS: 2000 US SCF: 2001
Median [p25 , p75] Median [p25 , p75]
Net Financial wealth
Outright owners 3,300 [0 , 15,000] 8,305 [1,005 , 40,915]
Mortgagors 375 [-1,600 , 6,400] 4,605 [105 , 22,701]
Renters 0 [-68 , 1,000] 145 [-255 , 2,425]
Net Housing wealth
Outright owners 70,000 [47,000 , 110,000] 111,500 [65,000 , 203,500]
Mortgagors 36,000 [16,000 , 70,000] 62,000 [25,000 , 126,000]
Renters 0 0 0 0
UK BHPS: 2005 US SCF: 2004
Median [p25 , p75] Median [p25 , p75]
Net Financial wealth
Outright owners 3,050 [0 , 17,034] 5,580 [605 , 56,805]
Mortgagors 0 [-3,250 , 5,000] 2,500 [-95 , 25,505]
Renters 0 [-455 , 500] 70 [-345 , 2,305]
Net Housing wealth
Outright owners 150,000 [100,000 , 220,000] 145,000 [76,000 , 265,000]
Mortgagors 97,000 [56,250 , 152,000] 77,000 [32,000 , 168,000]
Renters 0 0 0 0
Note: Net financial wealth (NLW): (i) from the BHPS, the value of savings and investments
net of outstanding non-mortgage debt; (ii) from the SCF, the value of checking, saving and
MM accounts, directly held mutual funds, stocks, bonds and t-bills, net of outstanding unse-
cured debt. Net housing wealth is the household’s estimate of the property value net of any
outstanding mortgage and home equity lines of credit. Trimmed at the top 5 percentiles of
the NLW distribution.
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ON-LINE APPENDIX
(not intended for publication)
A Data sources and definitions
A.1 National statistics
The aggregate time-series for the U.K. and the U.S. come from the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), respectively. Personal consumption
expenditure on non-durable goods and services expenditure, personal consumption expenditure on
durable goods and disposable income are all seasonally adjusted at the source. The series are divided
by total population to obtain per-capita values. The deflator used for the U.K. (U.S.) is the Retail
Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments (Consumer Price Index).
A.2 Household survey data
For the U.K., we use the Living Costs and Food Survey (formerly known as Family Expenditure
Survey) from 1975 to 2007 (1978 to 2007 when we use educational attainment for the probit regres-
sions). For the U.S., we use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (interview section) from 1981 to
2007.
Household expenditure. Non-durable goods and services : includes food, alcohol, tobacco, fuel,
light and power, clothing and footwear, personal goods and services, fares, leisure services, household
services, non-durable household goods, motoring expenditures and leisure goods. Between 1982
and 1987, food at home in the CEX is adjusted following Aguiar and Bils (2015). Durable goods:
durable household goods, motor vehicles and durable leisure goods. This includes expenditure such
as furniture and furnishings, electrical appliances and audio-visual equipment.
Mortgage payments and income. Mortgage payments: includes both interest payments and
capital repayments (not available individually over the whole sample). Net income: sum of labor-
and non-labor household income net of taxes paid.
Restrictions. We exclude households: (i) that do not report income, (ii) that report negative
net income, (iii) that are in either the top or the bottom 1% of either the non-durable or the
durable expenditure distributions of each housing tenure group at any quarter and (iv) whose head
is either below 25 years old or above 74 years old. Finally, for the CEX, which features a short
panel dimension, we only keep households that have not changed housing tenure status between
interviews. The LCFS comprises repeated cross-sections and thus each household is observed only
once. For comparability across countries and over time, all household variables in the LCFS for
the U.K. (in the CEX for the U.S.) are deflated by the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage
interest payments (Consumer Price Index) and divided by the household size to obtain real values
in per-capita terms.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1813
B Descriptive statistics
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Figure B.1: Distribution of Demographic Characteristics Across Housing Tenure Groups. Top row:
age of the household head at the time of interview; middle row: share of household heads who
completed more than compulsory education; bottom row: real per capita income net of taxes. Left:
U.K. (LCFS), 1975q1-2007q4. Right: U.S. (CEX), 1981q1-2007q4.
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Table B.1: Mean Quarterly Household Expenditures and Income over the full sample, in 2007 US$
Panel A: United Kingdom
non-durable durable mortgage or rent after-tax
expenditure expenditure payments income
Mortgagors 10,202 1,842 1,950 15,555
Outright Owners 10,030 1,625 13,617
Renters 6,807 750 1,613 9,310
Panel B: United States
non-durable durables mortgage or rent after-tax
expenditure expenditure payments income
Mortgagors 14,767 2,470 2,352 20,500
Outright Owners 14,482 2,032 16,495
Renters 11,945 1,542 2,397 14,340
Note: Data for the UK comes from the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) between
1975q1-2007q4; data for the US comes from the CEX between 1981q1-2007q4. The
values in the table are average household level expenditures and income by cohort. In
a given quarter these are constructed as a weighted average of all households within
each cohort. Entries refer to sample averages converted into 2007 US dollars.
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Figure B.2: The share of mortgagors, outright home owners and renters for different birth cohorts in the US and the UK. Birth cohorts
are defined by the birth year of the household head. Three birth cohorts are considered: younger households, middle aged households
and older households. The year cut-offs are chosen to ensure there are enough observations in each cohort group. The cut-offs also ensure
that each birth cohort has approximately the same average age across the two countries.
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C Evidence from official national statistics
It is useful to examine the aggregate response of non-durable expenditure, durable expenditure and
household income from the U.K. and U.S. official aggregate statistics. These results are presented
in Figure C.1. A cut in the policy rate raises durable expenditure, non-durable expenditure and
disposable income. More specifically, a 25 basis point monetary policy expansion leads to (i) a
persistent (but small) rise in non-durable consumption, which peaks at around 0.2% after about
10 quarters for the U.K. and 0.1% after 11 quarters for the U.S., (ii) a larger percentage increase
in durable expenditure (peaking at 1.2% for the U.K. and 1% for the U.S.), consistent with the
evidence in Barsky et al. (2007) and Sterk and Tenreyro (2015) and (iii) a rise in household income
(that reaches its maximum at 0.4% in the U.K. and just below 0.3% in the U.S.). While the U.K.
aggregate variables tend to exhibit a slightly larger adjustment, the differences between the two
countries are not large or significant.
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Figure C.1: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on the consumption of non-durable goods and services,
the expenditure on durable goods and household income from official aggregate national statistics. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90%
confidence bands. Top row: UK, data range 1975q1-2007q4. Bottom row: US, data range: 1981q1-2007q4.
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Figure C.2: Time series for real non-durable, durable and income per capita by cohort group
from the LCFS/CEX, together with the equivalent aggregate measure form national statistics (US
NIPA/UK ONS).
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D Excluding retired households
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Figure D.1: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on non-durable
consumption (ND), durable expenditure (D) and income net of tax for households below age 65.
U.K. data: FES/LCFS (1975-2007). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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Figure D.2: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on non-durable
consumption (ND), durable expenditure (D) and income net of tax for households below age 65.
U.S. data: CEX (1981-2007). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
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E Compositional change
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Figure E.1: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on the share of
mortgagors, outright owners and renters. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands. U.K.
data: LCFS (1975-2007) in top row; U.S. data: CEX (1981-2007).
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F US results post-1985
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Figure F.1: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on the consumption
of non-durable goods and services, the expenditure on durable goods and household income from
official aggregate national statistics (NIPA). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
Sample: 1985q1-2007q4.
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Figure F.2: Dynamic effects of a 25 basis point unanticipated interest rate cut on consumption
of non-durable goods and services, expenditure on durable goods, and income. Mortgagors (left),
outright owners (center) and renters (right). Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
Data from the CEX for the US. Data range: 1985q1-2007q4.
G Alternative measures income
To be added
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H The response of house prices
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Figure H.1: IRF for aggregate real house prices. Grey areas are bootstrapped 90% confidence bands.
Left: U.K. (1975-2007). Right: U.S. (1981-2007).
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I A stylized model
I.1 Households
There are, ex-ante, two types of households: patient households (PH) and impatient households (IH).
These are differentiated by their discount factors βH and βL respectively, with 0 < βL < βH < 1.35
They all derive utility from the consumption bundle xt, housing stock and/or services h˜t and dis-
utility from labor Lt:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t( x1−σt
1− σ + j log h˜t −
Lηt
η
)]
where σ > 0 is a curvature parameter, j is a housing demand parameter, and η > 0 is related to
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The consumption bundle xt is defined as
xt ≡ Cθt V 1−θt − μCθt−1V 1−θt−1 (2)
with Ct and Vt being non-durable consumption and the stock of durables, receptively; θ ∈ [0, 1] is
a share parameter and μ ∈ [0, 1) captures habit persistence. The stock of durables for a household
evolves according to the following law of motion:
Vt+1 =
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
))
Dt + (1− δ)Vt (3)
where Dt denotes purchases of new durables, Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
= φd2
(
Dt
Dt−1
)2
captures the costs of adjusting
durables, and δ is the rate of depreciation of consumer durables. There is a fixed stock of houses
H, which are sold and bought at a price qht .
I.2 Assets
I.2.1 Mortgages
Households can borrow/save through a multi-period (long term) instrument, which we refer to as
bond or mortgage. One unit of debt issued at t pays, starting in t + 1, the sequence of nominal
instalments 1, ρ, ρ2, ... , which decay at a rate ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, if Mt units of debt are issued at
t, the mortgage instalment at t+ j is given by
payt,t+j = ρ
j−1Mt j ≥ 1 (4)
35We assume that impatient (patient) households can trade a complete set of arrow securities with other impatient
(patient) households, but not with the patient (impatient) households. This implies that idiosyncratic risk can be
perfectly shared within households of the same type, but other risks cannot be insured with households of a different
type.
The total amount of instalment payments due at t is then given by
Bt =
t∑
j=1
payt−j,t
= Mt−1 + ρBt−1 (5)
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Given this notation, the value of the stock of debt at the beginning of each period is given by
Bstockt+1 =
(
Mt + ρMt−1 + ρ2Mt−2 + ...+ ρtM0
) · St = Bt+1 · St
where St is the time-t price of one unit of debt. The value of the real stock is given by
bstockt+1 ≡
Bstockt+1
Pc,t
= bt+1St =
(
mt + ρ
bt
πc,t
)
St (6)
where mt ≡ MtPc,t , bt ≡ BtPc,t and πc,t ≡
Pc,t
Pc,t−1 .
I.2.2 One-period bonds
PH can also save through a nominal one-period bond, traded in zero net supply. One unit of such
bond can be bought at a price of one, and earns a nominal return of Rt.
I.3 Production of durables and non-durables
Following Monacelli (2009), we model two sectors, producing durable investment goods D and non
durable goods C using labour as the only input. In each sector, there are competitive final good
producers and monopolistically competitive producers of intermediate varieties, facing the same
cost of adjusting prices following Rotemberg (1982).
In the symmetric equilibrium where intermediate producers use the same amount of labor, it is
possible to obtain an expression for the evolution of prices in each sector (Phillips curves)
πˆD,t = β
HEt (πˆD,t+1) +
(

D − 1
ϑD
)
mˆcD,t (7)
πˆc,t = β
HEt (πˆc,t+1) +
(

C − 1
ϑC
)
mˆcC,t (8)
where ”ˆ” variables denote deviation form a zero-inflation steady state, and πj,t ≡ Pj,tPj,t−1 is the gross
inflation rate in sector j.
Monetary policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted through the short term (one-period) rate Rt, following
a Taylor rule:
Rt = (Rt−1)rR
(
π1+rπt−1
(
Yt−1
Y
)rY
r¯r
)1−rR

R,t
where πt ≡ παπc,t π1−απD,t is a composite inflation index, Yt = Y αyC,tY 1−αyD,t is a composite output index
and r¯r, Y are steady state real rate and output.
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I.4 The model with an exogenous credit limit
We first consider, along the lines of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), the case where households
face an exogenous36 credit limit of the form
Stbt+1 ≤ Et
(
Ω¯
πt+1
Rt
)
(9)
If we define positive values of bt as debt (negative values are savings), then the real budget constraint
(in terms of the non-durable consumption good) for the impatient household reads
Ct + q
h
t Δht + q
d
tDt +
bt
πc,t
= wtLt + Stmt (10)
and for the patient household:
C
′
t + q
h
t Δh
′
t + q
d
tD
′
t −
b
′
t
πc,t
= wtL
′
t − Stm
′
t +ΠC,t +ΠD,c (11)
where patient household variables are denoted by “
′
”.
The problem for the impatient household is to maximize the following expression:
WIH = max{Ct,Dt,Vt+1,ht,Lt,bt+1,mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βL
)t
u (xt, ht, Lt)
subject to the budget constraint (10), the credit constraint (9), and the law of motion for the
durable stock and the outstanding debt, (3), (5). We also assume a transversality (No-Ponzi games)
condition.
Denote by λt the multiplier on the budget constraint; λtq
v
t the multiplier on the law of motion
for the durable stock, λM,t the multiplier on the law of motion for mortgage repayments, and λCC,t
the multiplier on the credit constraint. The optimality conditions for Ct, Dt, Vt+1, Lt, ht as well as
36One could also think of this as a borrowing limit tied to the steady state value of collateral.
the Euler equation, can then be written respectively as
λt = θ
(
Ct
Vt
)θ−1 (
x−σt − μβLEt
(
x−σt+1
) )
(12)
qdt = q
v
t
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
−
∂Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
∂Dt
Dt
)
+
+βLEt
(
λt+1q
v
t+1
λt
∂Φ
(
Dt+1
Dt
)
∂Dt
Dt+1
)
(13)
λtq
v
t = β
LEt
(
λt+1
(1− θ
θ
Ct+1
Vt+1
+ (1− δ)qvt+1
))
(14)
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Lη−1t = λtwt (15)
λtq
h
t
(
1 + φh
Δht
ht−1
)
=
j
h˜t
+ Et
(
βLλt+1q
h
t+1
(
1 + φh
Δht+1
ht
))
(16)
λt = β
LEt
(
λt+1
1 + ρSt+1
Stπt+1
)
+ λCC,tRt (17)
Condition (12) equates the shadow value of relaxing the budget constraint to the marginal utility of
non-durable consumption, which is a function of habits μ. Conditions (13) and (14) are standard,
and describe the expenditure and stock decisions for durables.37 Equation (15) is the usual intra-
temporal condition equating the marginal rate of substitution between non-durable consumption
and labour to the real wage. This condition is important to understand how a constrained household
adjusts hours worked in order to compensate for being borrowing constrained. Equation (16) relates
the shadow price of consumption to the marginal service value of housing in the current period,
and its expected resale value in the next period. Note that in this version of the model, the only
difference between D and housing is how they enter the utility of households. Finally, (17) is the
modified Euler equation, which involves the (expected) one-period holding return on the long term
mortgage 1+ρSt+1Stπt+1 .
The problem for the PH is similar, but only facing constraints (11) and (3), (5). The main
difference arises in the Euler equation which, for the patient household, reads
λ
′
t = β
HEt
(
λ
′
t+1
1 + ρSt+1
Stπt+1
)
(18)
37To see things clearly, assume for the moment no adjustment costs, i.e. Φ = Φ
′
= 0. Then these two conditions
can be combined into a standard optimality condition
qdt = β
LEt
(
λt+1
λt
(
UV,t + (1− δ)qdt+1
))
I.4.1 No-arbitrage pricing
The price St of the mortgage can then be written as
St = E
( ∞∑
j=1
Qt,t+jρ
j−1
)
=
1
Rt
+ ρE (Qt,t+1St+1) (19)
where Qt,t+j =
(
βH
)j λt+j
λt
for j ≥ 1 is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) of the patient household,
between t and t+j. This second equality assumes, crucially, that there is no arbitrage when pricing.
This means that a condition needs to be satisfied between the return of the long term debt and an
implicit one-period bond.38
38Up to a first order approximation, the key no-arbitrage pricing condition can be stated as
Et
( Rt
πt+1
)
= Et
(1 + ρSt+1
Stπt+1
)
Alternatively, we could also have assumed markets for two types of assets: a one-period bond, and a long-term
mortgage, with households being able to use the short term bond only as a saving instrument which pays a gross
nominal interest rate R1t . On the other hand, the mortgage market can be used both for saving and borrowing.
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We can define the (Macaulay) duration of this contract as
Dt(ρ) =
∞∑
j=1
(
Qt,t+j · j ρ
j−1
St
)
(20)
In a zero inflation steady state, equation (18) implies Qt,t+j =
1
Rj
=
(
βH
)j
and therefore the
mortgage price in steady state is
S =
βH
1− βHρ
while the steady state duration is equal to
D(ρ) =
1
1− βHρ (21)
Market Clearing
Goods, labour, housing and debt markets need to clear. In other words
YC,t = ωIH (Ct + ξh,t) + ωPH
(
C
′
t + ξ
′
h,t
)
+
ϑC
2
(πC,t − 1)2 YCt (22)
YD,t = ωIHDt + ωPHD
′
t +
ϑD
2
(πD,t − 1)2 YDt (23)
LC,t + LD,t = ωIHLt + ωPHL
′
t (24)
H = ωIHht + ωPHh
′
t (25)
0 = ωIHbt + ωPHb
′
t (26)
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of sequences for Ct, C
′
t , Dt, D
′
t, Vt, V
′
t , ht, h
′
t,
Lt, L
′
t, mt,m
′
t, bt, b
′
t, Lagrange multipliers and prices PC,t, PD,t, wt, q
h
t , q
d
t , St, Rt such that:
1. Ct, C
′
t , Dt, D
′
t, Vt, V
′
t , ht, h
′
t, Lt, L
′
t, mt,m
′
t, bt, b
′
t , as well as the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers, solve the household problems for given prices and interest rate Rt.
2. PC,t, PD,t, LC,t, LD,t solve the firms problem for given wt
3. Rt is set according to (I.3), and St, Rt satisfy a no arbitrage condition.
4. Prices PC,t, PD,t, wt, q
h
t , q
d
t , St, Rt are such that all markets clear.
I.4.2 Parametrization
The exogenous credit limit model is parametrized using the values in Table I.1 below. Most of
these are relatively standard and well within the range of estimates available in the literature. Two
parameters, however, deserve further explanation. In the collateral constraint model of the next
section, the value of the housing demand shifter, j, pins down the maximum loan-to-value ratio in
the impatient household’s budget constraint. To set the latter to the empirically plausible value of
75%, we need j = 0.468. For the sake of comparability across the two models, we then impose the
same value for j here.
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Our framework abstracts from investment, government spending and net exports. Accordingly,
at the aggregate level, income is equal to expenditure and therefore we need to calibrate the debt
to expenditure ratio Ω¯/Y . The household debt to disposable income ratio (or the private credit
to GDP) in the two countries has averaged around 110% while household expenditure tends to
represent about 60% of output, implying a debt to expenditure ratio of about 1.8. Finally, we
assume there are equal shares of constrained and unconstrained households.
Parameter Description Value
θ/(1− θ) elasticity of substitution between ND and D stock 4
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
βL, βH discount factor: mortgagors, outright owners 0.95, 0.99
1/(η − 1) Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
μ habits parameter 0.5
j housing demand shifter 0.468
δ depreciation rate durables 0.025
εC,D elasticity of varieties 4
ϑC,D cost of adjusting prices 150
rπ, rY , rR Taylor rule: CPI, output, smoothing 1.5,.05,.6
ωIH share constrained households 50%
ωPH share unconstrained households 50%
Ω¯/Y debt to expenditure ratio 1.8
1/(1− βHρ) Benchmark long term debt duration 1 year
Table I.1: Calibration of the model.
I.5 The model with an endogenous collateral limit
We now assume that the housing stock ht can be used as collateral, following Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Iacoviello (2005).39 The credit constraint (9) now reads
Stbt+1 ≤ φE
(
qh,t+1ht
πt+1
Rt
)
(27)
where φ is the steady state loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and qh,t+1ht is the real value of the housing
stock at t+1.
There is a rental market through which households can rent (from/to others) housing services
for one period at a rate pt. Households are now also heterogeneous with respect to the utility they
derive from renting.40 Within the impatient households, there are now two groups of agents. We
denote IHm those households who derive relatively higher utility from owned housing, and IHr those
households who derive similar utility from renting or owning. The population shares of IHm, PH
and IHr are exogenous and given by (ωIHm, ωPH , 1− ωIH − ωPH), consistent with the evidence in
39Note that we are not allowing the stock of durable goods Vt to be collateralizable. The reason for this is twofold.
First, although there might be some durable goods in the data that are collateralizable, this is not typically the case,
even for large durables such as vehicles. Second, we want to distinguish the role of durable goods from that of the
housing stock.
40This way of modelling renting and owning is a simplification. One could think of this as a reduced form way of
capturing life-cycle considerations which are not present in this class of model.
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Section 4.2 that the shares of each housing tenure group do not vary with changes in monetary
policy. But, importantly, the housing tenure choice (how much house to own vs. rent) will be
endogenous.
Housing utility (services) can be derived from housing owned or rented. Let ht ∈ R+ be the
housing stock owned, s−t ∈ R+ the housing rented to others, and s+t ∈ R+ the housing stock rented
from others. Housing services are then given by
h˜t,i = ht,i − s−t,i + γis+t,i i ∈ {PH, IHm, IHr} (28)
with γ ∈ [0, 1) capturing different reasons why households might preference to own rather than to
rent.
Crucially, γ is household specific: 0 < γIHm = γPH < γIHr = 1. This means that PH and IHm
derive a higher marginal utility from their housing stock that is not rented out, ht,i−s−t,i, than from
the housing stock that they may rent from others, s+t . For IHr, on the other hand, the marginal
utility is equal whether its owned or rented. All households face an individual housing feasibility
constraint
ht,i − s−t,i ≥ 0 (29)
meaning that they cannot rent out more than they currently own, ht,i, and they cannot sub-let.
41
Households also face a quadratic adjustment cost when adjusting the housing stock, given by
ξh,t = φh
(
Δht
ht−1
)2 qht ht−1
2
(30)
The impatient household (whether borrower or mortgagor/renter in equilibrium) solves the
following optimization problem
WIH = max{Ct,Dt,Vt+1,ht,s+t ,s−t ,Lt,bt+1,mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t
u
(
xt, h˜t, Lt
)
41Note that restriction (29) together with the non-negativity of s−t,i already imply that ht,i ≥ 0.
subject to (Lagrange multipliers in parenthesis)
Ct + q
d
tDt + q
h
t Δht +
bt
πc,t
+ ξh,t = wtLt + Stmt + pt
(
s−t − s+t
)
+ Tt (λt)
Vt+1 =
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
))
Dt + (1− δ)Vt (λtqvt )
h˜t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ht,i + γs
+
t,i − s−t,i if i = IHm
ht,i + s
+
t,i − s−t,i if i = IHr
(
λ3t
)
ht − s−t ≥ 0
(
λ5t
)
s−t ≥ 0
(
λ6t
)
s+t ≥ 0
(
λ7t
)
bt+1 = mt + ρ
bt
πt
(
λ8t
)
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Stbt+1 ≤ φE
(
qh,t+1htπt+1
Rt
)
(λBC,t)
The patient household solves
WPH = max{Ct,Dt,Vt+1,ht,s+t ,s−t ,Lt,bt+1,mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βH
)t
u
(
xt, h˜t, Lt
)
subject to (Lagrange multipliers in parenthesis)
Ct + q
d
tDt + q
h
t Δht −
bt
πc,t
+ ξh,t = wtLt − Stmt + pt
(
s−t − s+t
)
+ΠC,t +ΠD,c + Tt (λt)
Vt+1 =
(
1− Φ
(
Dt
Dt−1
))
Dt + (1− δ)Vt (λtqvt )
h˜t = ht,i + γs
+
t,i − s−t,i
(
λ3t
)
ht − s−t ≥ 0
(
λ5t
)
s−t ≥ 0
(
λ6t
)
s+t ≥ 0
(
λ7t
)
bt+1 = mt + ρ
bt
πt
(
λ8t
)
Market clearing
Denote with ′′ (double tilde) the variables of IHr and with ′ (single tilde) the ones for PH . Clearing
of markets implies
YC,t = ωIH (Ct + ξh,t) + ωPH
(
C
′
t + ξ
′
h,t
)
+ (1− ωIH − ωPH)C ′′t +
ϑC
2
(πC,t − 1)2 YCt
YD,t = ωIHDt + ωPHD
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)D
′′
t +
ϑD
2
(πD,t − 1)2 YDt
LC,t + LD,t = ωIHLt + ωPHL
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)L
′′
t
0 = ωIHmt + ωPHm
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)m
′′
t
H = ωIHht + ωPHh
′
t + (1− ωIH − ωPH)h
′′
t
s+t + s
+′
t + s
+′′
t = s
−
t + s
−′
t + s
−′′
t
I.5.1 Housing tenure in steady state
Proposition. For an owning-preference threshold γ¯ such that γ < γ¯, there exists zero-inflation
steady state (SSπ=0) in which:42
1. The PHs own housing stock (h
′
> 0) and rent out part of it (s−′ > 0).
2. Impatient renters do not own housing (h
′′
= 0) which means they cannot: (i) borrow (b
′′
= 0),
or (ii) rent to others (s−′′ = 0). They instead rent housing services (s+′′ > 0).
3. The IHms own housing (h > 0) but do not participate in the rental market (s− = s+ = 0).
Proof. See section I.6
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I.5.2 Parametrization
In Table I.2, we report the values used for the collateral constraint model which are, in most cases,
the same as in Table I.1. The steady state loan-to-value ratio, φ, (which did not appear in the
previous parametrization) is set to 75%, consistent with the sample averages reported by Besley
et al. (2013). On the other hand, the shares of mortgagors and outright owners mimic the average
values we observe in the FES/LCSF and CEX.
42We assume that the conditions above also hold for states “near the SS”. This is equivalent to requiring that the
wedge between the rental rate pt and the house price q
h
t not to diverge “too much” from its value in the steady state
SSπ=0. The assumption of no change in housing tenure following a monetary policy shock is, however, consistent
with the results presented in Section 4.2.
Parameter Description Value
θ/(1− θ) elasticity of substitution between ND and D stock 4
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
βL, βH discount factor: mortgagors, outright owners 0.95, 0.99
1/(η − 1) Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
μ habits parameter 0.5
j housing demand shifter 0.468
δ depreciation rate durables 0.025
εC,D elasticity of varieties 4
ϑC,D cost of adjusting prices 150
rπ, rY , rR Taylor rule: CPI, output, smoothing 1.5,.05,.6
ωIH share of mortgagors 45%
ωPH share outright owners 35%
m max LTV 0.75
Ω¯/Y debt to expenditure ratio 1.8
1/(1− βHρ) Benchmark long term debt duration 1 year
Table I.2: Calibration of the model.
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Figure I.1: Response of non-durable consumption, durable expenditure and income in the exogenous
debt limit model: constrained vs. unconstrained agents. Duration refers to the effective duration
of fixed-rate mortgage contracts in the aggregate economy, which on average is about one year for
the U.K. and 7 years for the U.S.
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Figure I.2: Response of non-durable consumption, durable expenditure and income in the housing
collateral constraint model: mortgagors versus outright owners. Duration refers to the effective
duration of fixed-rate mortgage contracts in the aggregate economy, which on average is about one
year for the U.K. and 7 years for the U.S.
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they need to own housing stock to use as collateral. A crucial element is the LTV being ¡1, or the
“haircut” on the value of the collateral being ¿0. This will imply that an increase in the amount of
collateralizable asset (in this case housing stock) they own, translates into a less than proportional
increase in the resources available to borrow. The SS relative rental rate p
qh
= 1 − β′ (determined
such that assets have the same returns) implies that, given the perfect substitutability between
renting and owning in terms of utility, a positive down-payment (m¡1) will make it suboptimal for
the IHr to own (i.e. invest) in any amount housing stock. For the IHm, however, a sufficiently
high “bias for owning”, reflected in a sufficiently low γ, implies they can overcome the relatively
high q
h
p by buying a house “smaller” than the one they would otherwise rent, and using it to get a
collateralized loan (a mortgage).
What the above means is that the collateral value of a house per se is not enough incentive for
the impatient households to invest / buy a house. This is true more in general in this kind of set-ups
where the assets are priced by the patient (unconstrained) guys, including Iacoviello (2005). What
we are adding in our set-up is the assumption that, for some households, the services provided by
a rented house are less valuable in terms of utility than the services provided by an own house.
The arguments above make use of the fact that owning a house and renting are substitutes in
terms of the utility generated. This implies that an increase of Δ units of housing stock h generates
the same increase in utility as an increase of 1γΔ units of rented housing s
+ (with γ = 1 in the case
of IHr households):
u
(
h+Δ+ γs+ − s−) = u(h+ γ (s+ + 1
γ
Δ
)
− s−
)
(31)
The idea of the proof is to show that, in a SS equilibrium with active mortgage markets, the
relative rental rate needs to be
p = qh
(
1− β’
)
in which case the PH will be indifferent between lending and buy-to-rent, and under which IHm will
want to own for a sufficiently low γ. For p > qh
(
1− β′
)
, the PH would prefer not to lend funds
through the mortgage market, but to buy-to-let as much as possible. For such relative prices, we
will see that the return of a buy-to-let strategy is such that Rbuy−to−let > R . This would imply a
collapse of the mortgage market and unbounded consumption growth, unless it bring the housing
I.6 Proof of Proposition I.5.1: ”Separation” In Steady State
Here we show that there is a steady state (SS) in which:
1. PH own housing stock (h
′
> 0) and rents out part of it (s−′ > 0)
2. Impatient renters do not own housing (h
′′
= 0) which means they cannot: (i) borrow (b
′′
= 0),
and (ii) rent to others (s−′′ = 0). They instead rent housing services from others (s+′′ > 0)
3. IHm own housing (h > 0) but do not participate in the renting market (s− = s+ = 0)
Intuition of the Proof:
At the SS interest rate R = 1
β
′ , both IHm and IHr households want to borrow in order to shift
consumption from the future to the current period. To do so, due to frictions in credit markets,
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price up and back to p = qh
(
1− β′
)
. For p < qh
(
1− β′
)
, it will be the case that neither PH nor
IHm will be willing to engage in buy-to-let, and therefore no household will be willing to rent to
IHr.
Patient Households’ Problem
Recall the relevant optimality conditions of the PH for the housing and renting variables, assuming
for the time being that there are no adjustment cost to changing housing
λ
′
tq
h
t =
jt
h˜
′
t
+ β
′
Et
(
λ
′
t+1q
h
t+1
)
+ λ5
′
t
ptλ
′
t =
jtγ
h˜
′
t
+ λ7
′
t
ptλ
′
t =
jt
h˜
′
t
+ λ5
′
t − λ6
′
t
In SS these conditions imply
λ
′
q
(
1− β′
)
=
j
h˜′
+ λ5
′
(32)
λ
′
p =
jγ
h˜′
+ λ7
′
(33)
λ
′
p =
j
h˜′
+ λ5
′ − λ6′ (34)
I will now consider different cases regarding the choice of (h, s+, s−) in SS, and analyze their pricing
and market clearing implications.
• Case I: Assume s+′ = 0
This implies that, due to Inada conditions, h
′ − s−′ > 0 and therefore λ5′ = 0, λ7′ ≥ 0 from
the KT conditions. Now, we have two possibilities:
– λ6
′
= 0: From equations (32) and (34) we then have that
p = qh
(
1− β′
)
(35)
while the KT conditions require s−′ ≥ 0. Is the relative rental rate (35) consistent
with s+
′
= 0 as assume above? To check this, assume that, while in SS, the household
switches, once and for all, from 1 unit of rented housing to γ units of owned housing that
are not rented out to other households, so that housing utility u
(
h˜
′
)
remains the same.
The resource cost at t is simply γqh while the resource benefit at t and in the future are
the rents not payed, qh
(
1− β′
)
. The net present value (NPV), or net resource gain is
NPV = qh
(
1− β′
)
− γqh + β′
∞∑
τ=0
β
′
qh
(
1− β′
)
= qh (1− γ)
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which is ¿0 for any value of γ.
What are the choices of IHr and IHm households given the relative prices in (35)? Con-
sider the case of the IHm (the case of IHr is similar but with γ = 1). As above, assume
that the household switches, once and for all, from 1 unit of rented housing to γ units
of owned housing that are not rented out to other households, so that housing utility
u
(
h˜
′
)
remains the same. The resource cost at t is γqh while the resource benefit at t is
the rent not paid, qh
(
1− β′
)
plus the extra amount the household can (and will, given
the binding borrowing constraint) borrow, Δb = β
′
mγqh . The net resource gain in the
current period is then
ΔWt = q
h
(
1− β′
)
+ β
′
mγqh − γqh (36)
From t + 1 onwards, assuming nothing else changes, the household rolls over the debt
and avoids paying rents. Therefore, the discounted value of all future gains starting in
t+ 1 is
ΔWτ>0 = β
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
(
qh
(
1− β′
)
− 1− β
′
β′
β
′
mγqh
)
=
β
1− β q
h
(
1− β′
)
(1−mγ) (37)
Note that ΔW > 0 for γ < 1,m < 1. The net resource change at t is positive if
γ¯t ≡ 1− β
′
1− β′m > γ
while the net (present value) of resource change is positive if
NPV ≡ ΔWt +ΔWτ>0 > 0
⇔
γ¯ ≡ 1− β
′
(1− β′m) (1− β) +mβ (1− β′) > γ
In other words, for γ < γ¯, IHm households prefer to buy houses with a mortgage, while
it is optimal for IHr households to rent, since for them, γ = 1.
At the relative price q
h
p implied by (35), a PH household is indifferent between buying an
extra unit of housing stock to rent out to other other households, and not doing so (or
lending it through the mortgage market). To see this, consider the following investment
strategy: at t, buy one unit of housing at price qh, and then rent it out. At t + 1, sell
that unit at price qh. Given that the PH is not constrained in her borrowing capacity,
she will not use this extra unit of housing as collateral to borrow. The net present value
of this strategy in SS (recall again that the stochastic discount factor in SS is 1)
NPV = qh
(
1− β′
)
− qh + β′qh (38)
= 0
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 75 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1813
This is consistent with the condition λ6
′
= 0 and s−′ ≥ 0.
Is this investment strategy optimal for a constrained IHm? Since the IHm household
uses the housing stock as collateral for borrowing more today, the NPV of a buy-to-let
strategy would be
NPVinvest = q
h
(
1− β′
)
− qh + β′mq + β
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
(
qh
(
1− β′
)
−mqh
(
1− β′
))
= qh (1−m) β − β
′
1− β < 0 (39)
since β < β
′
. Therefore, if p = qh
(
1− β′
)
, IHm households will not engage in buy-to-
let, and IHr can only rent from patient households. We have one possible SS:
{h > 0, s− = s+ = 0} ;
{
h
′
> 0, s−′ > 0, s+′ = 0
}
;{
h
′′
= s−′′ = 0, s+′′ > 0
}
; p = qh
(
1− β′
)
– λ6
′
> 0: From the KT conditions, this implies s−′ = 0, and from eqs. (32) and (34), we
have that
p < qh
(
1− β′
)
(40)
With this relative prices, IHr have even more incentives to rent. However, since s−′ = 0,
they can only rent from IHm households. The individual feasibility condition (29) rules
out sub-letting; therefore, if an IHm household rents to an IHr household, it has to do
so from their stock of housing. However, since a buy-to-let strategy, which keeps the
utility from housing constant, has a negative NPVinvest when p = q
h
(
1− β′
)
as shown
in (39) above, it will be more negative for p < qh
(
1− β′
)
. Therefore, this can not be
an equilibrium in SS.
• Case II: Assume s+′ > 0
This implies λ7
′
= 0 from the KT conditions. Linearity within the housing utility implies it
cannot be optimal for a household to rent and buy at the same time. Therefore it must be
either that: (i) h
′
= s−′ > 0, in which case the PH buys-to-let, or (ii) h′ = s−′ = 0. Lets
consider these cases separately.
– h
′
= s−′ > 0 : In this case we have λ6′ = 0. From equations (32) and (33) it follows
that
p = qh
(
1− β′
)
(41)
Someone has to rent to the PH. However, as shown above in eq (39), when p = qh
(
1− β′
)
it is not optimal for an IH household to buy-to-let. This cannot be an equilibrium.
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– h
′
= s−′ = 0: This means that the PH does not own houses, and rents from other
households. In this case we have λ5
′ ≥ 0, λ6′ ≥ 0 and therefore
p ≤ γqh
(
1− β′
)
(42)
Note, however, that the relative price q
h
p implied by (42) is even bigger than the one
implied by (41). Therefore, we can conclude that it wont be optimal for either IH
household to rent to the PH households. This cannot then be an equilibrium.
Impatient Households’ Problem
Equation (38) above showed that, when p = qh
(
1− β′
)
, a buy-to-let strategy for the PH has NPV
= 0. Note that the NVP of lending 1 consumption unit through the mortgage market is also 0 in
SS:
NPV mortgage = −1 + β′R
= −1 + β
′
β′
= 0
This implies that for p > qh
(
1− β′
)
, a patient household in SS will prefer to invest all resources
in a buy-to-let strategy, since in that case we would have
Rbuy−to−let > R =
1
β′
and we are assuming no uncertainty. This would imply that the mortgage market would collapse
unless house prices increase, since the PH would prefer to invest by a buy-to-let strategy rather than
by mortgage lending. Moreover, since Rbuy−to−letβ′ > 1, consumption would grow un-boundlessly
This cannot be a SS equilibrium that satisfies a transversality condition.
We now proceed from the IHm households optimal conditions in order to check whether there
is an alternative SS.
Without adjustment cost, the optimality conditions are
λtq
h
t =
jt
h˜t
+ βEt
(
λt+1q
h
t+1
)
+ Et
(
mλBC,tq
h
t+1πt+1
)
+ λ5t
ptλt =
jtγ
h˜t
+ λ7t
ptλt =
jt
h˜t
+ λ5t − λ6t
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which in SS imply
λqh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
=
j
h˜
+ λ5
λp =
jγ
h˜
+ λ7
λp =
j
h˜
+ λ5 − λ6
• Case I: Assume s+ = 0
This implies λ7 ≥ 0, and due to the inada conditions on u
(
h˜
)
, it must be that h − s− > 0,
implying λ5 = 0. Now we can consider two cases:
– s− > 0: then we have λ6 = 0 which implies
p = qh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
(43)
It is easy to check that, for such relative rental rate, switching from one rental unit to γ
units of housing stock has a positive net resource gain for the IHm for any value of γ < 1
, confirming indeed that it is optimal for the IHm to have s+ = 0. For the IHr, the net
resource gain (or NPV) of switching is
NPV = qh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
− qh + β′mqh
+
β
1− β
(
qh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
− (1− β′)mqh
)
= 0
implying they are indifferent between renting and buying.
As argued above, however, the relative prices in (43) imply that the PH would prefer to
engage in buy-to-let rather than lend through the mortgage market, and her consumption
would grow un-boundlessly since the return of such strategy would satisfy Rbuy−to−letβ′ >
1. This cannot be a SS equilibrium, since it would violate a transversality condition.
– s− = 0: We then have s− = s+ = 0 and λ5 = 0, λ6, λ7 ≥ 0. From the FOCs in SS, we
have that this is an optimal choice if
p = qh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
− λ
6
λ
≤ qh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
and
p = γqh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
+
λ7
λ
≥ γqh
(
1− β −m(β′ − β)
)
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